Hypothesis disconfirmation : improving mock-juror sensitivity to confession evidence by Port, MEH
  i 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Disconfirmation: Improving Mock-Juror Sensitivity to Confession 
Evidence 
Molly Port 
A report submitted as a partial requirement for the degree of Bachelor of Psychology 
with Honours at the University of Tasmania 2016 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ii 
 
Statement of Sources 
I declare that this report is my own original work and that contribution of others have 
duly acknowledged. 
Signed: ______________________________ Date: _____________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  iii 
Acknowledgments 
Thank you to my supervisor, Dr. Matthew Palmer, for your unwavering support 
throughout this year. I am grateful for the time you have committed to this project, 
and for the skills you have helped me develop. Your enthusiasm for research is 
inspiring, and I appreciate that you take the time to share it with less knowledgeable 
individuals, such as myself. 
 
Thank you to Laura Brumby, for your knowledge and assistance in setting up my 
online survey. I am grateful for your patience, and attention to detail. I also 
appreciate that you understood my excitement about the small things, such as 
learning to insert a hyperlink.  
 
Thank you Dr. Jim Sauer for your co-supervision, and allowing me to crash your 
office for skype meetings with Matt. Your unrelenting patience, ability to simplify 
complex ideas, and appreciation for hand drawn graphs is gratefully received.  
 
I would like to thank my friends and family for encouraging me throughout this 
process, and motivating me when things got difficult. For bringing me food and 
making sure I ate more than vegemite toast for every meal, and for making me laugh. 
To my housemates Sophie and Darcy, I am grateful to you for putting up with my 
lack of cleaning and general grumpiness over the last few months, I promise to pick 
up my game! To Julian for your unconditional positive regard and ability to keep me 
calm when things got overwhelming, I am forever grateful. 
 
I would like to thank my mum and dad, and two brothers (Thom and Drew) for 
supporting me throughout my entire education, and always pushing me to achieve 
my best. I could not have done it without you. 
 
Lastly, I would like to thank Daisy (blonde Labrador) and Ella (black Labrador) for 
your unconditional love and affection.  
 
  
  iv 
Table of Contents 
Statement of Sources ............................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................. iii 
List of Tables ........................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures ........................................................................................................vii 
Abstract .................................................................................................................... 1 
Introduction .............................................................................................................. 2 
Three Types of False Confessions .........................................................................4 
Risk Factors Associated with False Confessions ...................................................6 
Increased Risk of Wrongful Conviction ................................................................7 
Competing Perspectives on Juror Sensitivity to Inconsistencies ............................8 
Moderating Sensitivity ........................................................................................ 10 
Understanding the Influence of Cognitive Bias ................................................... 11 
Overcoming Confirmation Bias: Hypothesis Disconfirmation ............................. 12 
The Present Research: Summary of Aims and Hypotheses .................................. 13 
Method ................................................................................................................... 16 
Participants and design........................................................................................ 16 
Materials ............................................................................................................. 17 
Procedure ............................................................................................................ 21 
Results .................................................................................................................... 21 
Data Screening and Manipulation Checks ........................................................... 23 
Effect of Consistency of Guilt Ratings: One-way Bayesian ANOVA .................. 25 
Planned Comparisons: ANCOVAs ...................................................................... 25 
Effects of Sex and Age........................................................................................ 28 
Mediation Analysis ............................................................................................. 29 
Analysis of No-Confession Control Group .......................................................... 31 
Discussion .............................................................................................................. 32 
Limitations ......................................................................................................... 37 
Implications ........................................................................................................ 39 
  v 
References .............................................................................................................. 41 
Appendices ............................................................................................................. 50 
Appendix A ........................................................................................................ 50 
Appendix B......................................................................................................... 51 
Appendix C......................................................................................................... 55 
Appendix D ........................................................................................................ 57 
Appendix E ......................................................................................................... 59 
Appendix F ......................................................................................................... 62 
Appendix G ........................................................................................................ 63 
Appendix H ........................................................................................................ 64 
Appendix I .......................................................................................................... 65 
Appendix J .......................................................................................................... 66 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  vi 
List of Tables 
Table 1: Lee and Wagenmakers’ Interpretation of Evidence Strength Based on 
Obtained Bayes Factors                                                                                            23  
Table 2: Mean Rating of Consistency for each of the Consistency Conditions       24 
Table 3: Descriptives for Guilt Ratings Across the Seven Conditions                    32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  vii 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Hypothetical comparison of guilt ratings for each consistency condition, 
based on error sensitivity and insensitivity perspectives                                          15                                                        
Figure 2. Mean guilt ratings for hypothesis disconfirmation and control conditions 
across the three consistency conditions                                                                    28 
Figure 3. Mediation effect of large inconsistencies on plausibility ratings, moderated 
by CFI                                                                                                                       31                                                     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Disconfirmation: Improving Mock-Juror Sensitivity to Confession 
Evidence 
Molly Port 
Word Count: 9992
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
1 
Abstract 
The present study investigated the extent to which mock-jurors are able to recognise 
factual inconsistencies in confession evidence. To assist this, a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention was trialled, as a method of improving sensitivity, and 
reducing judgements of guilt when a confession is unreliable (Brewer, Keast & 
Rishworth, 2002). Two hundred and eighty-three participants (197 female, 4 other; 
aged 18-78 years, M = 32.9, SD = 13.55) were randomly allocated to one of six 
conditions on the basis of variation in confession consistency, and the presence or 
absence of the hypothesis disconfirmation. Content of confessions varied in 
consistency with police facts of the case across three conditions (consistent, small 
inconsistencies, large inconsistencies). After viewing a police report and confession 
statement, the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention required participants to 
generate alternative explanations for the suspect confessing, without having 
committed the crime; prior to provision of verdict. Results supported an error 
sensitivity perspective (cf. insensitivity perspective), which purports that jurors are 
better at recognising inconsistencies than previously acknowledged (Henderson & 
Levett, 2016; Palmer, Button, Barnett & Brewer, 2016; Woesetehoff & Meissner, 
2016). Evidence for the hypothesis disconfirmation was not sufficient to warrant a 
convincing interpretation, however patterns of results were promising. Implications 
for theory, research and practice are discussed. 
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Introduction 
Confession evidence is one of the most potent forms of evidence in obtaining a 
conviction, and it is therefore critical that confessions presented in court are 
objectively reliable, or, in the case that they lack reliability but remain admissible, 
jury members are adequately equipped to recognise unreliable confessions (Appleby, 
Hasel & Kassin, 2013; Kassin, 2008, 2014). The suggestion that someone might 
confess to a crime they did not commit is counterintuitive in the context of self-
incrimination, and based on a common-sense understanding of human behaviour, it 
would seem reasonable to believe that false confessions do not occur, in reality 
(Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo & Redlich, 2010; Scott-Hayward, 2007). In 
contradiction to this presumption however, a number of instances of false 
confessions have been recorded, posing an important issue for the criminal justice 
system (Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Kassin, 2012). Problematically, an assumption 
underlying this common-sense notion is that a confession inherently indicates guilt; 
an innocent person would not confess, therefore someone who has confessed, is 
surely guilty (Kassin, 2008; 2014). In combination, this disbelief in the likelihood of 
an innocent person confessing, and an over-belief in the strength of confession 
evidence generally, makes confessions critically influential in the judicial context, 
and an important area of consideration for both legal scholars and researchers 
(Garrett, 2010). The focus of the present research, is to test juror sensitivity to 
inconsistent confession evidence. 
The circumstances in which false confessions occur warrants consideration, 
but equally, the consequences of a false confession once presented at trial, also 
requires significant attention (Kassin, 2012). The risk of conviction is increased 
when a suspect confesses, due to the strength of confession evidence in persuading 
investigators and jurors of suspect guilt (Kassin, 1997; Kassin, 2012). The fact that a 
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confession is the only type of evidence which can be used in isolation to gain a 
conviction, without additional supporting evidence, makes confessions particularly 
compelling (Malloy, Shulman & Cauffman, 2014). According to the Innocence 
Project (2017a), 29% of DNA exonerations in the United States (instances where 
forensic testing of DNA evidence has led to an overturned conviction; Innocence 
project, 2017a), include instances of a false confession. This statistic indicates the 
known rate of false confessions, and highlights the associated risk of prosecution and 
wrongful imprisonment (Innocence Project, 2017a). As Leo (2009) points out, this 
percentage of recorded cases is likely only the tip of the iceberg, given an absence of 
available DNA evidence, in most contested cases.  
False confessions are not only problematic in that they lead to the wrongful 
imprisonment of an innocent person, but in the case that a conviction is made, they 
also result the perpetrator remaining free, posing a potential risk to society 
(Kavanaugh, 2016). In combatting false confessions, there are two crucial issues that 
require examination. The first issue relates to the occurrence of false confessions, 
and the need for strategies to reduce them (Leo, 2009). Research addressing this 
issue has established suspect vulnerabilities and police interrogation tactics as stable 
risk factors associated with false confessions, resulting in safeguards such as the 
implementation of mandatory videotaping of police interviews (Garrett, 2010; 
Kassin, 2014). The second issue relates to how false confessions are processed in 
court. Assuming that safeguards will not eliminate their occurrence entirely, there is 
a requirement for the implementation of measures that will ensure decision-makers 
in the criminal justice system (investigators, jurors, and judges), are adequately 
equipped to process confession evidence in a critical manner (Henkel, et al., 2008; 
Kassin, 2012). Evidenced methods of improving juror processing of false 
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confessions however, are somewhat lacking, and it is within this paradigm that the 
current research is situated. Previous research, highlights that while factual errors in 
witness evidence undermines the credibility of witness testimony, from a jurors’ 
perspective, the same does not seem to occur in the context of confession evidence 
(Malloy & Lamb, 2010; Tenney, MacCoun, Spellman & Hastie, 2007).  
Increasing jurors’ ability to recognise false confessions requires 
acknowledgement of the cognitive biases inherent in the jury decision making 
process, and assessment of potential methods to reduce them (Ask & Granhag, 
2005). In the present study, utilisation of a hypothesis disconfirmation technique is 
proposed to limit the impact cognitive biases have on jury decision making 
processes, and increase the critical evaluation of confession evidence (Brewer, Keast, 
& Rishworth, 2002). The aim with this intervention is to improve mock jurors’ 
recognition of factors that may bring the reliability of a confession into question, 
such as factual inconsistencies, and make them more discerning in the verdict they 
are willing to return, based on the evidence. Before exploring the cognitive biases 
relevant to juror perceptions of confession evidence, and how these might be 
attenuated, there is a need to discuss the occurrence of false confessions more 
generally. To facilitate this discussion, a number of important areas will be 
addressed: different types of false confessions, risk factors associated with false 
confessions, and how false confessions increase the risk of wrongful conviction. 
Three Types of False Confessions 
 Three types of false confessions exist in the literature; voluntary, coerced-
compliant, and coerced-internalised (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1985). Voluntary false 
confessions, as the name suggests, are those which are offered freely by an 
individual, in the absence of police pressure (Leo, 2009). A person may confess 
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voluntarily for one of two likely reasons: either they are protecting the real 
perpetrator, or they are hoping to gain notoriety through confessing to a high profile 
crime (Leo, 2009). An example of the latter occurred when Charles Lindbergh’s 
infant was kidnapped in 1932, and over 200 men came forward to confess to the 
crime (Kassin, 2014; Kassin et al., 2010). These types of false confessions are most 
easily recognised by investigators as unreliable, and typically do not make it to trial, 
as they lack important detail (Kassin, 2014; Leo, 2009). In these instances, 
confessors are usually only be able to provide details already available in the public 
domain, while failing to present any new crime specific information (Kassin et al., 
2010; Leo, 2009).  
 Coerced-compliant confessions are the most common type of false 
confession, and occur when a suspect confesses only to comply with police demands 
(Kassin, 2012; Leo, 2009). Such compliance is given in the hope that it will bring 
some benefit for the suspect, such as the termination of an interrogation or leniency 
in sentencing – benefits that outweigh the cost of continued denial (Leo 2009). As 
the suspect confesses with knowledge they are truly innocent, coerced-compliant 
confessions are typically recanted shortly after interrogation (Leo, 2009). An 
infamous case of a coerced-compliant confession occurred when five young men, 
known as The Central Park Five, admitted to the rape and murder of a women in 
Central Park in 1989, stating in a later recantation that they thought they would be 
free to go if they confessed (Kassin et al., 2010). Regardless of their recantation, the 
five men spent between 6 and 13 years in prison, and were only exonerated when the 
true perpetrator came forward in 2002 (Kassin et al., 2010). Unfortunately, this 
shows that even recanted confessions may be admissible in court, and due to the 
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potency of confession evidence, they remain powerful in swaying jurors towards 
guilt (Leo, 2009; Kassin & Sukel, 1997).   
 Coerced-internalised confessions are rare, as they represent a situation in 
which the suspect has come to believe in their own guilt, even though they are 
innocent (Kassin, 2014). The most influential factor in leading to internalisation of 
guilt, is the presentation of false evidence, such as polygraph results, DNA evidence, 
or witness testimonies, which all imply suspect guilt (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004; 
Kassin & Kiechel, 1996). In this circumstance, given the supposed wealth of 
evidence against them, a suspect may begin questioning their innocence, which in 
combination with exhaustion and confusion due to aggressive interrogation tactics, 
can lead them to believe they committed the crime (Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). In 
1998, after a lengthy investigation, and the reported existence of physical evidence 
linking him to the crime, Michael Crowe internalised blame for his sister’s murder, 
and subsequently provided a detailed confession. He later recanted, and was not 
convicted of the crime, but this example demonstrates how coercive methods of 
interrogation can lead to internalised confessions (Kassin et al., 2010).  
Risk Factors Associated with False Confessions 
 There are a range of factors that increase the likelihood of a false confession, 
with some pertaining to the nature of the interrogation, while others relate to the 
specific vulnerabilities of the suspect (Kassin, 2014). Those relevant to the 
interrogation include the presence of coercion, duration of interrogation, presentation 
of false evidence, social isolation, threats of violence or harsh sentencing, promises 
of leniency for cooperation, and deprivation of necessary resources such as food, 
water and sleep (Innocence Project,  2017b; Leo, 2009; Kassin, 2014). Such 
techniques become instrumental in pressuring a suspect towards complying with 
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police demands, with the impetus being that the suspect is motivated to escape an 
adverse interrogation, even if it means confessing to a crime they did not commit 
(Garrett, 2010; Kassin et al., 2010).  
 There are important risk factors that increase a suspects vulnerability to 
manipulation during interrogation (Drizin & Leo, 2004; Kassin, 2014 Leo, 2009). 
Those at the greatest risk of confessing, in response to police-coercion, are juveniles, 
individuals with diminished capacity or intellectual impairment, and those with 
mental illnesses (Goldstein, Condie, Kalbeitzer, Osman & Geier, 2003; Kassin et al., 
2010). This vulnerability stems from a lack of understanding of the law, 
misjudgements of consequences, and underestimation of the protective importance of 
safeguards such as Miranda rights (United States right to silence and attorney; United 
States Courts, 2016): highlighted by the majority of suspects who falsely confessed, 
having waived theses rights (Goldstein et al., 2003; Kassin, 2014). Vulnerable 
suspects engage in a maladaptive decision-making process characterised by 
impulsivity, immediate gratification and miscalculation of future consequences, 
known as the “immaturity of judgement”, (Owen-Kostelnik, Reppucci, & Meyer, 
2006). Overconfidence in the phenomenology of innocence, as those convicted on 
the basis of a false confession, report a miscalculation of consequences associated 
with admission, believing that safeguards in the justice system, would prove their 
inherent innocence (Kassin, 2008; Kassin et al., 2010).   
Increased Risk of Wrongful Conviction 
False confessions increase the risk of wrongful conviction in three key ways. 
First, and most obviously, a confession is self-incrimination and is the strongest 
piece of evidence contradicting innocence (Garrett, 2010). Second, the presence of a 
confession taints other pieces of evidence (Kassin, 2014). For investigators, a 
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confession typically signifies ‘case closed’, which means the search for additional 
evidence (potentially exculpatory) is discontinued (Kassin, 2012). Even in the case 
that exculpatory evidence is at hand, a confession may prevent this from being 
presented in court (Kassin, 2012). In addition to this, research has shown that experts 
and mock-jurors who initially provide a not-guilty verdict on the basis of available 
evidence, have gone on to change their verdicts to guilty when a confession is later 
presented (Kassin, 2014; Kukucka & Kassin, 2014). Finally, people are insufficiently 
critical in their evaluation of confession evidence (Malloy & Lamb, 2010). 
Understanding this lack of criticality, requires contemplation of the psychological 
processes of the jury.  
In comparison to other types of evidence (eye witness testimony and 
character testimony), jurors assign a greater weight to confession evidence (Kassin & 
Neumann, 1997). This effect is so strong, that in the circumstance in which a judge 
directs jurors to discount a confession, based on its unreliable content, higher rates of 
conviction are maintained, compared to when there is no confession at all (Kassin & 
Neumann, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Levett, Danielsen, Bull Kovera, & Cutler, 
2005). This finding is maintained even when jurors assert that they heeded judicial 
instruction and discounted the confession, reporting it had no bearing on their final 
verdict (Kassin & Neumann, 1997; Kassin & Sukel, 1997). This indicates that when 
confession evidence is present, even if it is deemed unreliable, it prompts inherent 
bias towards guilt (Kassin, 2012).  
Competing Perspectives on Juror Sensitivity to Inconsistencies  
Often in false confessions there are notable inconsistencies between police 
facts and the content of a confession. (Palmer, Button, Barnett, & Brewer, 2016). For 
example, in the case of Earl Washington who was convicted of rape and murder in 
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Virginia (1984), there were multiple inconsistencies between the information he 
provided and the known facts of the case (Innocence Project, 2017c). Most glaringly, 
was the inconsistency between Washington’s confession of having stabbed the 
victim 2-3 times, and the reality that the victim sustained 38 stab wounds (Innocence 
Project, 2017c). This confession was the main piece of evidence presented against 
Washington at trial, and a jury used it to convict him of rape and murder, for which 
he received the death sentence (Innocence Project, 2017c). Washington was 
imprisoned for 16 years, and came within 9 days of execution, before being 
exonerated in 2000. This is only one of numerous cases, where despite errors, jurors 
have been insufficiently sensitive to inconsistencies between facts of the case and a 
suspect’s confession (Kassin et al., 2010). According to research, insensitivity to 
inconsistencies on behalf of jurors is the result of strong cognitive biases, that 
override the opportunity for critical, objective evaluation of confession evidence 
(Kassin, 2012). 
In line with this, the traditional understanding of juror processing of 
confession evidence constitutes an error insensitivity perspective (Kassin et al., 2010; 
Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Malloy & Lamb, 2010), which purports that the influence of 
cognitive biases is robust, consistently leading jurors to be unaware of, or ignore 
inconsistencies in confession evidence. More recent research however, has 
challenged this perspective, with findings that suggest jurors may be less prone to 
bias and more sensitive to inconsistencies in confession evidence than was 
previously thought - supporting an error sensitivity perspective (Palmer et al., 2016; 
Henderson & Levett, 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). This variation in 
findings highlights the need for further research on the influence of cognitive biases 
on jurors perceptions of confession evidence. 
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Moderating Sensitivity 
A potential moderating factor that could impact juror sensitivity to 
inconsistencies, is individual differences in the extent to which jurors believe 
coercive interrogation is an appropriate police tactic, and conversely, whether or not 
they support the idea that someone could be coerced into falsely confessing (Clark, 
Boccacinni, & Turner, 2010). If a juror believes coercive interrogation tactics are 
appropriate, they likely do not believe that such tactics could lead an innocent person 
to confess, and thus are less likely to view inconsistencies as a reason to question a 
confession (Clark et al., 2010). Opposingly, those who support the idea that an 
innocent person could be coerced into confessing, will likely recognise 
inconsistencies as a potential sign of coercion, and more easily accept that a false 
confession may have occurred. To assess these attitudes, Clark et al., (2010), 
developed the Attitudes Towards Coerced Confessions scale (ATCC), which 
assesses attitudes towards coerced confessions on two subscales; The Coercive 
Interrogation subscale, which measures support for the use of coercive interrogation 
tactics (e.g. presentation of false incriminating evidence, offers of leniency), and the 
Coerced Confessions subscale, which measures support for the idea that in certain 
circumstances (those involving coercion), a person could be forced to confess (Clark 
et al., 2010).  
Juror ability to recognise inconsistencies and adjust their verdicts 
accordingly, may also vary depending on individual differences in cognitive 
flexibility. Cognitive flexibility relates to an ability to change mental sets and adapt 
to varying environmental stimuli (Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). A specific 
component of cognitive flexibility, which is of interest in this context, is 
characterised by the awareness of multiple explanations for human behaviour, and 
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the ability to produce multiple solutions in response to a problem (Dennis & Vander 
Wal, 2010). This relates to confession evidence, as recognition of inconsistencies 
requires jurors to adjust their presumption of guilt, and consider alternative reasons 
for a confession (Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). The Cognitive Flexibility Index 
(CFI) developed by Dennis and Vander Wal (2010) can be utilised to measure this 
construct, and assess the impact it has on juror sensitivity to inconsistencies.  
Understanding the Influence of Cognitive Bias 
A key cognitive bias that plays an integral role in jurors’ over-estimation of 
confession evidence, and which underlies a tendency to disregard inconsistencies, is 
the confirmation bias (Kassin, 2012; Palmer et al., 2016). People are prone to 
confirmation bias because it reduces ambiguity – individuals are motivated to seek 
out information which confirm their hypotheses, as this affirms their understanding 
of the world, and gives meaning to their lives (Klayman & Ha, 1987). There are three 
main components to the confirmation bias; seeking out information that confirms a 
belief, ignoring or actively discounting information that contradicts this belief, and 
interpreting ambiguous evidence as supporting the original belief (Kassin, Reddy & 
Tulloch, 1990; Nickerson, 1998). In the current context, the presence of a confession, 
sets into motion a confirmation bias that assumes guilt on the basis that an innocent 
person would not confess (Kassin et al., 2010; Leo, 2009). This bias means jurors to 
process all subsequent evidence in line with their guilty hypothesis, using ambiguous 
evidence to add to this narrative (Kassin, 1997, Kassin, 2012; Nickerson, 1998). 
Further, the confirming aspect of this bias is so strong, that it typically prevents 
jurors from considering alternative explanations or exculpatory evidence, often 
leading them to actively discount or ignore it (Nickerson, 1998). As such, the 
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confirmation bias fosters automatic processing of confession evidence, aided by 
heuristics, which limits the extent to of critical analysis of evidence (Kassin, 2012).  
Overcoming Confirmation Bias: Hypothesis Disconfirmation 
One technique proposed to limit the extent to which people engage in biased 
processing of information, is hypothesis disconfirmation (Brewer et al., 2002; Koriat, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1980). Hypothesis disconfirmation works to challenge 
confirmation of existing hypotheses or judgements, by actively encouraging people 
to consider that initial beliefs might be incorrect, and explore alternative explanations 
for behaviours or events (Brewer et al., 2002). Research has provided evidence that 
this method reduces bias and overconfidence in beliefs, across several different 
domains: predicting individual outcomes (Griffin, Dunning & Ross, 1990), future 
events (Hoch, 1985), and general knowledge (Koriat et al., 1980). In the context of 
confession evidence, it is hypothesised that disconfirmation encourages the 
generation of plausible alternative explanations for a confession, other than guilt, 
which in turn increases the salience of risk factors, such inconsistencies. This process 
is proposed to reduce the cognitive biases that reinforce an assumption of guilt, by 
highlighting a tendency to process information consistent with beliefs, and 
promoting increased consideration of divergent explanations (Brewer et al., 2002). In 
doing this, it challenges thinking based on automatic heuristics and encourages a 
more analytical style of thought (Koriat et al., 1980). Importantly, the aim of this 
intervention is not to increase general scepticism of confession evidence, but to 
increase sensitivity to risk factors, such as inconsistencies, and encourage critical 
evaluation of reliability based on this (O’Donnell & Safer, 2017; Woestehoff & 
Meissner, 2016).  
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The Present Research: Summary of Aims and Hypotheses 
The aim of the current research is to assess juror sensitivity to inconsistencies 
in confession evidence, and to test whether this can improved by attenuating 
confirmation bias, which has a detrimental impact on the juror decision-making 
process (Kassin, 2012). To implement this, a hypothesis disconfirmation technique 
will be employed. Although previous research using this technique, found a null 
effect of hypothesis disconfirmation (Porter, 2016), this is likely due to the 
generalised approach, and lack of case specificity related to the exercise. As such, we 
intend to extend this research, by manipulating confession consistency, and adopting 
a case-specific hypothesis disconfirmation intervention (Brewer et al., 2002). 
Confession consistency will be manipulated in reference to police facts, across three 
conditions: consistent, small inconsistent, and large inconsistent. It is possible that 
jurors’ processing of inconsistencies might vary depending on the magnitude of the 
inconsistency, with evidence showing that jurors process different types of 
inconsistencies differently (e.g. factual errors are viewed more sceptically than self-
contradictions are; Holt & Palmer, 2018). The rationale for varying inconsistency 
across small and large inconsistencies, is to provide insight into whether the 
magnitude of errors affects the processing of confession evidence. 
For the hypothesis disconfirmation, half the participants in each consistency 
condition will receive the intervention, while the other half will not (control 
condition). In addition to this, we will include a seventh condition as a no-confession 
control group (hypothesis disconfirmation also absent), to assess the impact that 
confessions have on guilt ratings, compared to the absence of a confession. Given 
that all conditions require participants to read stimulus materials and attend to 
details, we built an attention check manipulation into the design. Checking that 
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participants are paying sufficient attention helps to increase the validity of obtained 
data (Aust, Diedonhofen, Ullrich & Musch, 2015; Oppenheimer, Meyvis & 
Davidenko, 2009), and is especially useful as the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention requires active engagement (Kung, Kwok & Brown, 2018). Based on 
the instructional manipulation check (IMC) developed by Oppenheimer et al. (2009), 
all participants responded to a ‘trap’ question which required them to read 
instructions carefully, in order to answer the question correctly.  
There are three main hypotheses relevant to the present study. First, we 
hypothesise that jurors will be sensitive to inconsistencies in confession evidence, 
and will adjust their guilt ratings accordingly. If our results support this, we would 
expect to see a reduction in guilt ratings, when the evidence is inconsistent (with a 
greater reduction in the large inconsistency condition compared to the small). This 
pattern of results would support the recent findings of Henderson & Levett (2016), 
Palmer et al. (2016), and Woestehoff and Meissner (2016), adding weight to the error 
sensitivity perspective, by suggesting jurors are sufficiently sensitive to 
inconsistencies, and succumb to cognitive biases to a lesser extent than was 
previously thought (see Figure 1). Alternatively, if the error insensitivity perspective 
is supported, we would expect to see high guilt ratings maintained, across all three 
consistency conditions (Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & Sukel, 1997; Malloy & Lamb, 
2010), highlighting that jurors are indeed poor at recognising inconsistencies, due to 
various cognitive biases (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1. Hypothetical comparison of guilt ratings for each consistency condition, 
based on error sensitivity and insensitivity perspectives.  
 
Our second hypothesis relates to the effect of the hypothesis disconfirmation 
and the way we anticipate it will interact with the consistency manipulation. We 
expect that when the evidence is inconsistent, we will see a reduction in guilt ratings 
in the disconfirmation condition, compared to the control. This would suggest that 
the intervention is increasing jurors’ sensitivity to inconsistencies, and the extent 
which this affects their guilt ratings, providing support for the intervention. 
Concurrent to this, when the evidence is consistent, we would expect guilt ratings to 
remain similarly high between the disconfirmation condition and the control, 
highlighting that the intervention is not increasing general scepticism of confession 
evidence (O’Donnell & Safer, 2017; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). If guilt ratings 
drop in the intervention group, it is likely that that disconfirmation is working to 
increase scepticism (Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Co
nsi
ste
nt
Sm
all 
inc
on
sis
ten
cie
s
Lar
ge
 in
co
nsi
ste
nc
ies
G
ui
lt 
ra
tin
g
Error Sensitivity 
Perspective
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
Co
nsi
ste
nt
Sm
all 
inc
on
sis
ten
cie
s
Lar
ge
 in
co
nsi
ste
nc
ies
G
ui
lt 
ra
tin
g
Error Insensitivity 
Perspective
  
16 
Additionally, we hypothesise that plausibility of alternative explanations, as found by 
Palmer and Holt (manuscript submitted for publication), is the likely mechanism 
through which hypothesis disconfirmation works to increase recognition of 
inconsistencies, and affect guilt ratings. As such, we expect that larger 
inconsistencies will trigger the generation of more plausible alternative explanations 
for why a suspect confessed, translating to reduced perceptions of guilt. In testing 
this mediation pathway, we also hypothesise that individual differences in support 
for coerced confessions/coercive interrogations and cognitive flexibility may 
moderate the effect of inconsistencies on plausibility.  
 Finally, we hypothesise that in comparison to the no-confession control, all 
other conditions, containing confession evidence will have higher guilt ratings; 
indictive of how compelling confessions are, even if inconsistent.  
 
Method 
Participants and design  
Three hundred and eighty-nine participants began the study, but 106 were 
removed due to incomplete responses. The final sample included 283 participants 
(197 female, 4 other), with an age range of 18-78 years (M = 32.9, SD = 13.55). We 
did not conduct a formal a-priori power analysis, as the literature does not provide 
sufficient basis for estimating an effect size for the effect of hypothesis 
disconfirmation on judgments of guilt. We based our sample size estimates on 
previous studies examining the effect of inconsistencies on mock-juror judgments of 
guilt (n = 129; Palmer et al., 2016), and the recommendations outlined by Simmons, 
Nelson and Simonsohn (2011) of  ≥ 20 participants per cell. Based on these, we set 
our cell minimum to 30, aiming for at least 210 participants. Our sample size 
  
17 
exceeded this. Participants were recruited through Facebook, and from the University 
of Tasmania (using UTas psychology research participation system and distribution 
of fliers throughout the Sandy Bay campus). Participation was entirely voluntary, 
and first year psychology students were awarded 0.5 research credits, while all other 
participants were offered the opportunity to enter a draw to win a $50 voucher. 
Materials  
The format of the study was an individualised online survey, developed using 
LimeSurvey (Version 2.06; Schmitz, 2015). This software ran the survey, randomly 
allocated participants to conditions, and collected data. Anonymity of responses was 
ensured as each participant was given a participant ID number, and no identifying 
details were recorded in the main study.  
A single page mock police report (see Appendix C), outlined the case facts of 
a break-and-enter burglary. This detailed police procedures and findings in response 
to the incident, including procurement of statements from the residents and 
neighbours; an inventory of items stolen; collection of evidence from the property 
(forensic and photographic); compilation of potential suspects; interviewing of 
charged suspect; obtaining confession statement; and consideration of results from 
forensic of evidence. For condition 7 (the no-confession control) the police report 
was varied slightly, in that there was no mention of a confession, it just outlined that 
the suspect was charged on the basis of the circumstantial evidence (see Appendix 
D).  
 There were three versions of the suspect confession statement, each varying 
in its level of consistency (see Appendix E for all versions). For the consistent 
condition, details in the confession were entirely consistent with the police report, 
while for the small and large inconsistency conditions there were a number of errors. 
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All three confessions were similar in regards to who, where, and how the crime was 
committed, with inconsistencies pertaining to time of crime, site of entry, items 
stolen, witness reports of vehicle type, and location to which stolen goods were 
taken. In comparison to the consistent condition, the small inconsistencies condition 
contained minor variations in facts (e.g. suspect incorrectly reported stealing pearl 
earrings instead of a pearl necklace), while the large inconsistencies condition 
contained major variations (e.g. suspect incorrectly reported stealing a gold watch 
instead of a pearl necklace). 
 The hypothesis disconfirmation intervention (see Appendix F) asked people 
to consider the case information they had just read, and think about what possible 
reasons there could be for why the suspect (Mr. Wood), might have confessed to the 
reported crime, even if he had not committed it. Subsequently they were asked to 
write down the reason they deemed to be most likely in this case, and rate its 
plausibility on a 10-point scale from 0% (not at all plausible) to 100% (entirely 
plausible). Participants could not leave alternative reason box blank, but could put “I 
don’t know” in the instance that they could not come up with anything. This stimulus 
was absent in the controls (conditions: four, five, six, and seven). 
 Verdict was measured on a guilt rating scale, which varied in 10% increments 
from 100% innocent to 100% guilty – there was no mid-point so participants were 
forced to decide which they supported more, out of guilt or innocence. Many 
previous studies have opted to measure guilt using a dichotomous verdict, and have 
additionally obtained a continuous measure of confidence in the chosen verdict 
(Kassin & Wrightsman, 1981). The benefit of recording guilt on a continuous scale is 
that it combines verdict, and confidence in verdict into a single measure, which 
allows for greater nuance in interpretation of results.   
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 To ensure that our manipulation of consistency was effective, participants 
were asked to rate how consistent they thought the confession was, with the police 
facts of the case on a 10-point scale (0 = not at all consistent, 100 = completely 
consistent). Participants in the no-confession control did not complete this question.  
 The ATCC is a validated measure, with internal consistency of a = .78 for 
the coercive interrogation scale, and a = .73 for the coerced confessions scale. The 
subscales are moderately negatively correlated with each other (r = -.23, p <.01), 
which is not surprising given that they incongruent attitudes, but this has 
implications for scoring – subscales must be scored independently. Construct validity 
of each subscale has been confirmed through comparison with relevant measures, 
such as the Juror Bias Scale (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1983). Both subscales of the 
ATCC scale were presented to participants as a single questionnaire, as 
recommended by Clark et al. (2010). The overall scale included 9 statements in total 
(4 for coerced interrogations, 5 for coerced confession), and participants were 
required to select the extent to which they agreed with each statement, on a 5-point 
Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree; see Appendix G). Statements 
indicated support for either coercive interrogation practices (e.g. “police officers 
should be able to do whatever it takes to get criminal suspects to confess), or for the 
occurrence of coerced confessions (e.g. “an innocent person could be coerced into 
confessing to a crime he/she did not commit”). Higher scores on each subscale 
indicated greater support for each attitude (coercive interrogation range = 4 – 20; 
coerced confession range = 5 – 25). 
The CFI is a validated measure, containing two subscales: the Control 
subscale (measures inclination to view difficult situations as controllable), and the 
Alternatives subscale (measures ability to perceive multiple explanations for human 
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behaviour, and ability to generate multiple, varied solutions to a single problem; 
Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). For the current research, only the Alternative subscale 
was relevant. Psychometrically, the Alternatives subscale has excellent internal 
consistency (a = 0.91), high 7 week test-retest reliability (r = .75, p <.001), and 
sufficient evidence for convergent construct validity (compared to the Cognitive 
Flexibility Scale [Martin & Rubin, 1995]), r =.62, p<.001, and concurrent criterion 
validity (Beck Depression Inventory – Second Edition [Beck et al., 1996]), r = -.20, 
p<.01. The Alternatives subscale presented to participants contained 13 statements, 
each requiring a response on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree; see Appendix H). In response to statements such as, “I like to look at 
different situation from many different angles”, participants were required to 
consider how much each statement reflected their thinking style. Higher scores 
indicated higher cognitive flexibility (range = 13 – 91). 
 A downside to using an online survey format, is that there is no indication of 
how diligent participants are in their responses (Aust, Diedonhofen, Ullrich & 
Musch, 2015; Oppenheimer, 2009). To detect inattentive participants, Oppenheimer 
developed the instructional manipulation check (IMC), which assesses whether or 
not participants are reading instructions carefully, and responding with the optimal 
response. This manipulation entails a standard question format, of instructions and 
response options, however within the instructions, a statement is made that 
participants should refrain from selecting a response option, instead clicking through 
to the next page. In our case, the instructional manipulation check consisted of a 
single question: “Which TV show do you like the most, from the following list?”, 
with five response options. Included in the instructions for this question was the 
direction: “In order to demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please ignore 
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the multiple-choice question below, and instead of responding, click ‘next’ to 
proceed to the next question” (see Appendix I).    
Procedure 
Prior to beginning the study, all participants read an information sheet (see 
Appendix B), and provided their consent by selecting to continue the study. 
Following a 2 x 3 (+1) between-subjects design, participants were randomly 
allocated to one of seven conditions. Participants in the three main control conditions 
read the police report, viewed a variation of the confession, were asked to provide a 
guilt rating and consistency rating, and then completed both the ATCC and CFI 
subscales. In the three intervention conditions, the procedure was the same as above, 
except for the addition of the hypothesis disconfirmation and plausibility rating, after 
viewing the confession, and prior to rating guilt. For the no-confession control, 
participants viewed the police report, were asked to provide a guilt rating, and 
responded the ATCC and CFI scales. Finally, all participants were required to 
provide demographic details, including age, sex, English fluency and country of 
residence and were given the opportunity to provide personal details for the draw to 
win in a new page. Demographic details, including age, sex, English fluency and 
country of residence were also recorded.   
 
Results 
Frequentist approaches to null hypothesis significance testing (NHST) 
consider how extreme the data are under the null hypothesis (H0), basing rejection of 
H0 on an arbitrary cut off point of p <.05 (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014; Quintana & 
Williams 2018). Focus on assessing whether or not data disproves the null, with a 
failure to consider the data under the alternative hypothesis, means NHST is biased 
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against the null, and increases the risk of a type I error (Wagenmaker et al., 2018a). 
Some scholars say it is not sufficient to preference the alternative hypothesis on the 
basis that the null exhibits poor predictive ability – rather, there needs to be a 
comparison of the predictive ability of both H0 and H1 (Quintana & Williams, 2018; 
Wagenmakers et al., 2018a). Bayesian inference solves these problems by 
quantifying evidence in favour of the null, and the alternative, and comparing the 
two (Jarosz & Wiley, 2014). As such, we chose to run our analyses using a Bayesian 
approach, as we felt this comparative framework allowed for greater depth of 
interpretation. To run our analyses we used JASP software, an open-source statistical 
package (JASP, 2018). We used default priors  based on a Cauchy distribution, 
where r for scale fixed effects = 0.5, r for scale random effects = 1, and r for scale 
covariates = 0.354 (JASP, 2018). To aid our interpretation of obtained Bayes Factors, 
we followed Lee and Wagenmarkers’ (2013) classification scheme for strength of 
evidence in support of either the null or the alternative (see Table 1).   
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Table 1  
Lee and Wagenmakers’ interpretation of evidence strength based on obtained 
Bayes Factors. 
Bayes Factor Evidence Category  
> 100 Extreme evidence for H1 
30-100 Very strong evidence for H1 
10-30 Strong evidence for H1 
3 – 10  Moderate evidence for H1 
1 – 3  Anecdotal evidence for H1 
1 No evidence 
1/3 – 1  Anecdotal evidence for H0 
1/10 – 1/3  Moderate evidence for H0 
1/30 – 1/10 Strong evidence for H0 
1/100 – 1/30 Very strong evidence for H0 
< 1/100 Extreme evidence for H0 
 
 
Data Screening and Manipulation Checks  
 In screening the data for outliers, participants who had not completed full 
responses to all survey questions were removed (n = 105). Participants who failed the 
attention check (n = 70), were also removed from one data set, and the analyses 
conducted with and without them. Given that there was no difference in the main 
findings when excluding participants who failed the attention check, all participants 
were retained in the final data set (n = 284).  
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To ensure that our manipulation of consistency was effective, we compared 
ratings of consistency across the three conditions. We ran a Bayesian ANOVA, 
which highlighted that in the context of our data, the alternative hypothesis was far 
more likely to be true, compared to the null hypothesis (BF10 = 1.628e+28). This 
indicates extreme evidence in support of differences in consistency ratings between 
the three consistency conditions. To follow this up, we ran post hoc comparisons, 
which provided very strong to extreme evidence in support of the alternative 
hypothesis across all comparisons (see Table 2 for descriptives). That is, it was much 
more likely that a difference in consistency ratings existed (cf. no difference), 
between small inconsistencies and the consistent condition (BF10 = 91.45); between 
large inconsistencies and the consistent condition (BF10 = 4.014e+28); and between 
small inconsistencies and large inconsistences (BF10 = 4.33e+12). These results 
provide strong evidence for the effectiveness of our consistency manipulation.  
 
Table 2 
Mean Rating of Consistency for each of the Consistency Conditions 
Condition M SD n 
Consistent 82 15 75 
Small Inconsistencies 69.9 24 80 
Large Inconsistencies 35.1 27.6 96 
Note: Consistency rated as percentage out of 100.  
Note: M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = participants 
 
We checked to see if the data met the assumptions for Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) and Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA), namely normal distribution, 
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homogeneity of variance, linearity between the dependent variable and covariates 
(ANCOVA only), and independence of observations (Field, 2009). Although there 
were some violations regarding homogeneity and linearity, we did not consider these 
severe enough to prevent us from running the proposed analyses.  
Effect of Consistency of Guilt Ratings: One-way Bayesian ANOVA 
 To assess whether our results supported the error sensitivity or error 
insensitivity perspective, we ran a one-way Bayesian ANOVA which looked at the 
effect of the three consistency conditions on guilt ratings. The analysis revealed that 
given the data, the alternative hypothesis was much more likely to be true (BF10 = 
1.465e+6), indicating extreme evidence for variation in guilt ratings across the 
consistency conditions. Follow up post hoc comparisons, showed minimal support 
for a difference in guilt ratings between the consistent condition (M = 15.67, SD = 
5.3, n = 75) and the small inconsistencies condition (M = 13.7, SD = 6.3, n = 75, 
BF10 = 1.393). There was extreme support for the alternative hypothesis when 
considering differences between the consistent condition and the large 
inconsistencies condition (M = 9.98, SD = 6.21, n = 96), and between small 
inconsistencies and large inconsistencies, where the alternative was far more likely to 
be true in both cases (BF10 = 4.472e+6, BF10 = 151.41, respectively). These results 
suggest that guilt ratings did differ as a function of consistency, providing support for 
the error sensitivity perspective.  
Planned Comparisons: ANCOVAs1  
We ran a series of planned comparisons to compare the effect of the 
hypothesis disconfirmation with the control condition, at each level of consistency 
                                               
1Initially we ran an omnibus test, but decided subsequently that we would run planned comparisons. 
As Rosnow and Rosenthal stipulate (1991), we have a responsibility to run the analyses that best 
answer our research question. Running planned ANCOVAs allowed us to more accurately answer our 
research questions and specific hypotheses.  
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(see Figure 2). If the intervention is effective at prompting jurors to process 
confession evidence more carefully, without increasing scepticism, we should find 
that guilt ratings are lower in the intervention group compared to the control, for 
small and large inconsistencies, but not for the consistent. If the intervention is 
working to make participants more sceptical of confession evidence (regardless of 
the quality of the confession), then we would see reduced guilt ratings in the 
consistency condition as well.  
Our first planned comparison looked at the effect of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation on guilt ratings, when the evidence was consistent. To assess this, 
we ran a one-way ANCOVA, with ATCC and CFI scores entered as covariates. This 
was to control for individual differences in testing the effects of the hypothesis 
disconfirmation. This approach allows for greater sensitivity in testing the 
intervention effect, as it removes a portion of unexplained variance (the influence of 
the covariates). The results of the Bayesian ANCOVA revealed that the null 
hypothesis was 3.61 times more likely to be true compared to the alternative (BF01 = 
3.61, d = 0.14, 95% CI[-.32, .59]), providing evidence that there was likely no 
difference in guilt ratings between the hypothesis disconfirmation condition (N = 41, 
M = 15.34, SD = 4.84) and the control (N = 34, M = 16.06, SD = 5.85). This 
suggests the null model was the best fit for the data, when the evidence was 
consistent. Including the ATCC subscales and the CFI scores as covariates only 
operated to strengthen the evidence for the null (subscale1, BF01 = 13.16, subscale2, 
BF01 = 13.58, CFI, BF01 = 10.9).  
 Our next comparison looked at the effect of the hypothesis disconfirmation 
on guilt ratings when the evidence contained small inconsistencies. In this instance 
the alternative hypothesis was 2.7 times more likely to be true than the null, 
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suggesting that guilt ratings did differ as a function of the intervention (BF10 = 2.712, 
d = 0.54, 95% CI[.09, .98]), as they were lower in the hypothesis disconfirmation 
condition (n = 37, M = 11.89, SD = 6.37,) than in the control condition (n = 43, M = 
15.19, SD = 5.91). However according to Lee and Wagenmakers’ classification 
scheme (2013), this result only provides anecdotal evidence in support of the 
alternative hypothesis, making the interpretation inconclusive. Controlling for ATCC 
and CFI scores reduced the amount of evidence in support of the alternative 
hypothesis (Coerced Interrogation subscale, BF10 = 0.611, Coerced Confession 
subscale 2 BF10 = 1.458, CFI, BF10 = 0.674), indicating that the best fit for the data, 
was the model which included only the intervention. 
 Our final comparison looked at the effect of hypothesis disconfirmation on 
guilt ratings when there were large inconsistencies. As with the small inconsistencies 
condition, there was some evidence that guilt ratings were lower in the hypothesis 
disconfirmation condition (n = 51, M = 8.61, SD = 6.79), than in the control 
condition (n = 45, M = 11.56, SD = 6.36), as these results were 2.6 times more likely 
to occur under the alternative hypothesis than under the null (BF10 = 2.603, d = 0.5, 
95% CI[.08, .90]). Again however, this evidence would be classified as anecdotal 
(Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013), indicating that there is not enough evidence to draw 
strong inferences from the current data set. Interestingly, there was a greater impact 
of one covariate in this instance, whereby controlling for differences in attitudes 
towards coerced interrogations yielded an increased Bayes Factor10 of 6.914. This 
suggests that when inconsistencies are large, and Coerced Interrogation scores are 
controlled for, it is nearly 7 times more likely that the data will support the 
alternative hypotheses. This provides slightly more evidence in support of there 
being a difference in guilt ratings between large inconsistencies and the consistent 
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condition, due the intervention. The evidence in favour of this model, compared to 
the model containing only the intervention, is roughly a factor of 3 (6.914/2.603 = 
2.66). 
 
Figure 2. Mean guilt ratings for hypothesis disconfirmation and control conditions 
across the three consistency conditions (0 = 100% innocent, 20 = 100% guilty). Error 
bars represent 95% CIs around the mean.  
 
Effects of Sex and Age 
 Further analysis included testing for sex differences in guilt ratings and an 
effect of age on guilt ratings. A Bayesian independent-samples t-test analysing sex, 
revealed that given the data, it was over 3.5 times more likely that the null hypothesis 
was true, compared to the alternative, suggesting that males (n = 82, M = 13.51, SD 
= 6.141) and females (n = 197, M12.55, SD = 6.141) did not differ greatly in the 
guilt ratings they provided (BF01 = 3.580). Conducting a Bayesian correlation matrix, 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
Consistent Small inconsistencies Large inconsistencies No confession
Gu
ilt
 ra
tin
g
Control Hypothesis disconfirmation
  
29 
the results provided evidence against a correlation between age and guilt ratings, 
with the null hypothesis 8 times more likely to be true, given the data (BF01 = 8.103). 
Mediation Analysis 
We conducted mediation analyses to test whether plausibility ratings of 
alternative explanations acted as a mechanism through which inconsistencies in 
confession evidence affected guilt ratings. Specifically, we wanted to investigate 
whether the presence of inconsistencies triggers the generation of more plausible 
alternative explanations, translating to reduced perceptions of guilt. Additionally, we 
tested a moderated-mediation model, hypothesising that the effect of inconsistencies 
on the generation of alternative explanations would be stronger for people with high 
cognitive flexibility, and with supportive attitudes towards coerced confessions. 
These analyses were conducted using participants from the intervention conditions (n 
= 129), as plausibility ratings were only relevant to the hypothesis disconfirmation. 
Using PROCESS software (Hayes, 2013), we ran two mediation analyses; one 
comparing consistent evidence with small inconsistencies and one comparing 
consistent with large inconsistencies (see Appendix J for output). 
Comparison of the consistent condition with the small inconsistencies 
condition revealed no mediation effect, as inconsistencies did not affect plausibility 
ratings B = -.91, p = .864, 95% CI [-11.43, 9.61], nor did plausibility affect guilt 
ratings, B = -3.44, p = .674, 95% CI [-.04, .07]. In this model, only the direct effect 
of inconsistencies on guilt ratings was significant, B = -3.44, p = .009, 95% CI [-
5.99,-.89]. We included CFI scores as a potential moderating variable between 
inconsistencies and plausibility, however it did not produce any effect on the model 
(B = -.35, p = .221, 95% CI [-.933, .22]. 
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Comparison of the consistent condition with the large inconsistencies 
condition, revealed partial moderated-mediation (see Figure 3). In this instance, the 
first leg of the mediation pathway showed a significant effect of inconsistencies on 
plausibility ratings (B = 5.33, p = .032, 95% CI [.46, 10.21]). This effect was greater 
for people with high CFI scores (B = .69, p = .016, 95%CI [.13,1.23]), indicating that 
cognitive flexibility moderated the effect of inconsistencies on plausibility of 
alternative explanations; bigger inconsistencies led to greater plausibility ratings, and 
this effect was magnified for people with high cognitive flexibility. Increases in 
plausibility ratings however, did not translate to an affect on guilt ratings (B = -.03, p 
= .175, 95% CI [-.08, .01]), meaning the indirect effect was insignificant, although 
the direct effect of inconsistencies on guilt ratings remained (B = -3.2, p<.001, 95% 
CI [-4.34, -2.05]).  
For both models (consistent vs small) and (consistent vs large), we also ran 
the Coerced Confessions subscale as a moderator, in the same fashion as the CFI. 
This however, did not yield a significant result, indicating that attitudes towards 
coerced confessions did not moderate the relationship between inconsistencies and 
plausibility, all ts < 1.15, all p values > .25.  
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Figure 3. Mediation effect of large inconsistencies on plausibility ratings, moderated 
by CFI.  
* ≤.05, ** ≤.001  
 
Analysis of No-Confession Control Group 
 To compare the no-confession control group, with the other 6 conditions, we 
ran a Bayesian ANOVA. The results of this analysis, revealed an overall difference 
in guilt ratings across the 7 conditions, indicated by greater support for the 
alternative hypothesis, than the null (BF10 = 1.568e+7). The no-confession control 
group however, did not have significantly lower guilt ratings than all other 
conditions, as we had expected. Post hoc follow up comparisons showed varying 
levels of support for the alternative hypothesis in some conditions, and support for 
the null in others (see Table 3 for descriptives and Bayes Factors). Overall, guilt 
ratings for the no-confession condition were lower than for conditions involving a 
consistent confession, and the small inconsistencies control condition. 
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Table 3  
Means and standard deviations for guilt ratings across the seven conditions, n = 
number of participants per condition.  
Condition M SD n BF10 BF01 
7 (+ 1 
control) 
1 (consistent x HD) 15.34 4.84 41 38.59 - 
 2 (small x HD) 11.89 6.37 37 - 3.86 
 3 (large x HD) 8.588 5.80 51 2.75 - 
 4 (consistent x 
control) 
16.06 5.85 34 43.21 - 
 5 (small x control) 15.19 5.91 43 9.98 - 
 6 (large x control) 11.56 6.36 45 - 4.21 
 7 (+1 control) 11.47 4.44 32 - - 
Note: M = mean, SD = standard deviation, n = participants 
 
Discussion 
The current study assessed juror responses to confession evidence, comparing 
verdicts across varied levels of consistency between the confession and police facts 
of the case: consistent, small inconsistencies, large inconsistencies. This analysis 
allowed evaluation of support for two different theoretical perspectives underlying 
juror processing of confession evidence, the error sensitivity perspective and the 
error insensitivity perspective. In addition to this, we trialled a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention, with the aim of further increasing juror sensitivity to 
inconsistencies within confessions. The findings of the study are summarised below.  
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Our first research question pertained to whether or not jurors were sensitive 
to inconsistencies in confession evidence. In contrast to anecdotal and case evidence, 
but consistent with recent research, our hypothesis was that jurors would be sensitive 
to inconsistencies and able to adjust their guilt ratings accordingly (Palmer et a., 
2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). Our findings supported this hypothesis, as 
there was evidence that guilt ratings were lower in the large inconsistency condition 
compared to both the small inconsistency and consistent conditions. There was no 
difference however, in guilt ratings between the small inconsistent condition and the 
consistent condition, suggesting jurors have a harder time recognising 
inconsistencies when they are more subtle. These results support an error sensitivity 
perspective, suggesting jurors are more proficient in critically appraising confession 
evidence and adjusting their verdicts in response to inconsistencies, than previously 
thought (Henderson & Levett, 2016, Palmer et al., 2016; Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016). This contrasts the error insensitivity perspective, which asserts that jurors are 
oblivious to inconsistencies in confession evidence (Kassin et al., 2010; Kassin & 
Sukel, 1997; Malloy & Lamb, 2010). It must be acknowledged however, that the 
error insensitivity perspective still holds merit as it is based largely on real-world 
cases, which deviate from the crime specified in this study (Woestehoff & Meissner, 
2016). In these cases, the types of crimes associated with false confessions are 
typically violent, including racial and sexual factors (Drizin & Leo, 2004). The 
ramifications of these factors for juror sensitivity to inconsistencies are discussed 
later.  
Our second research question pertained to whether or not the hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention would be an effective method of increasing sensitivity 
to inconsistencies. We hypothesised that sensitivity as measured by a reduction in 
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guilt ratings, would only occur when the confession contained inconsistencies, as 
when the confession was consistent, guilt ratings would remain at similar rate to the 
control condition. This hypothesis is based on the greater likelihood of suspect guilt 
in this instance, and the fact that the hypothesis disconfirmation should increase 
critical analysis of evidence, but not general scepticism (Brewer et al., 2002; 
Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). Additionally, we hypothesised that even if our 
results supported the error sensitivity perspective, the hypothesis disconfirmation 
intervention would increase this sensitivity further.  
Overall, the results offered some support for the notion that the hypothesis 
disconfirmation prompted jurors to process confession evidence more carefully. 
Analysis of the consistent condition supported our hypothesis, in that there was no 
great difference in guilt ratings between the intervention condition and the control. 
This suggests that hypothesis disconfirmation does not make people more sceptical 
of confession evidence, rather participants remain confident in guilt when the 
confession consistent, regardless of the intervention. This is a positive finding as it 
indicates, that at the very least, the intervention is not making participants 
unwarrantedly critical, in circumstances in which they should have relative 
confidence in the reliability of the evidence. The caveat of this however, is that the 
evidence in favour of this interpretation is not overwhelmingly convincing. With the 
Bayes Factor only just above 3.5, there is certainly need for further investigation to 
confirm effect.  
Findings from the inconsistent conditions provide some support for the 
hypothesis disconfirmation, however as with the consistent condition, the evidence is 
not convincing enough to be conclusive. In both the inconsistent conditions, the 
results favoured a difference in guilt ratings between the intervention and control 
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conditions, but they were not clear-cut enough to allow us to interpret the 
intervention as effective. In the large inconsistencies condition, the evidence in 
support of a genuine difference increased when controlling for the Coercive 
Interrogation subscale. This may be because people who exhibit pro-coercion 
attitudes, are less likely to think that coercion was a valid reason for confessing, and 
thus the intervention is less effective.  
The mediation analysis showed some effect of inconsistencies on plausibility 
ratings, but only when inconsistencies were large – this effect varied as a function of 
cognitive flexibility. As hypothesised, those with higher cognitive flexibility were 
able to generate more plausible alternative explanations. Importantly, in contrast to 
Holt and Palmer (manuscript submitted for publication), this effect did not translate 
into a reduction in guilt ratings, highlighting that plausibility of alternative 
explanations was not the mechanism through which inconsistencies affected guilt 
ratings. The implies there may be some other mechanism underpinning the effect of 
inconsistencies on guilt ratings. In considering potential mechanisms, it is possible 
that inconsistencies prompt jurors to be more suspicious about confession evidence 
(Fein, McCloskey & Tomlinson, 1997), and hence, a ‘need for more evidence’, 
influences juror responses to inconsistencies and the extent to which they are 
convinced of a suspect’s guilt. In the context of mock-juror studies, where available 
evidence is typically limited (due to constraints on variable manipulation), 
inconsistencies may operate to increase suspicion of confession reliability, and 
reduce the extent to which jurors are willing to return a guilty verdict, based on the 
evidence. As such, inconsistencies may activate a desire for more information, which 
in turn may push jurors to be more measured in their verdicts. Another viable 
mechanism relates to perceived voluntariness of the confession (Alceste, Crozier & 
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Strange, 2018), which may mediate the relationship between inconsistencies and 
guilt ratings, as inconsistencies prompt jurors to question the circumstances under 
which the confession was obtained. Recent evidence shows that errors in confessions 
cause mock-jurors to rate confessions as more likely to have been coerced rather than 
provided voluntarily (Alceste et al., 2018), which may translate to a  reduction in 
guilty verdicts. As we are uncertain exactly how the hypothesis disconfirmation 
affects processing of inconsistencies, future research should test these possible 
mediators. 
Analysis of the no confession control did not elucidate a significant 
difference in guilt ratings between the confession conditions and the no confession 
control, as we had expected. Given the compelling nature of confessions (Kassin & 
Sukel, 1997), we hypothesised that the mere presence of a confession, albeit 
factually inconsistent, would increase guilt ratings compared to no confession. It is 
not surprising that this effect was not as overwhelming as we had predicted, when 
considered in the context of increased media attention, which likely improves lay 
knowledge of false confessions and wrongful convictions. This notion suggests that 
over time, jurors are becoming better at responding to confession evidence, based on 
an increased understanding of the relevant risk factors (Henkel et al., 2008; 
Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). This has developed through increased exposure to 
popular media sources such as, Making a Murderer (Ricciardi & Demos, 2015), 
which contain explanations of problematic interrogation procedures and factors that 
increase the risk of a person falsely confessing (Henkel et al., 2008). Testing this in a 
future research would be of value, and may be as simple as including a measure of 
exposure to relevant sources, as a potential moderator. 
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Limitations 
A limitation of the present research relates to the inferential nature of the 
evidence. Aside from the confession, all additional evidence (contained in the police 
report) was entirely circumstantial. The shoe print, the blood sample, and the eye 
witness sighting of a similar car, either do not directly implicate the suspect, or 
cannot be objectively verified (Heller, 2006). This lack of direct evidence, linking 
the suspect to the crime, may play into the ‘need for more evidence’ mechanism 
outlined above, and subsequently either under or overestimate the effect of the 
intervention. Research on juror responses to circumstantial versus direct evidence, 
suggests that jurors are more likely to acquit when the evidence is purely 
circumstantial (Heller, 2006; Wells, 1992). If jurors in the control condition reduced 
their guilt ratings based on the circumstantial nature of the evidence, this may have 
led to underestimation of the true effect of the intervention. Alternatively, if 
circumstantial evidence also led participants in the intervention condition to reduce 
their guilt ratings, this may have led to overestimation of effect, which may not be 
seen in the instance that stronger corroborating evidence presented. Presenting 
evidence that directly implicates the suspect, in conjunction with a confession, may 
make belief in guilt more prominent, and in turn render the intervention less 
effective. However, in this situation the intervention may also acutely affect the 
confirmation bias, when it is more potent.  
A second limitation of our research relates to the ecological validity of the 
individual mock-juror paradigm employed (Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). This 
issue brings into question how well the results from an individualised mock-juror 
study reflect the reality of the group decision-making which juries participate in 
(Bornstein, 1999; Diamond, 1997). Jury deliberation is seen as a rationale and logical 
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exercise, where discussion of information in an objective manner attenuates the 
biases relevant to individual presumptions and opinions. The influence of social 
dynamics and group processes however, mean this is rarely the case (Bray & Noble, 
1978). As such, although individual mock- juror paradigms have high internal 
validity (Kapardis, 2014), generalisability is limited as they fail to consider the effect 
of an array of biases inherent to group processes that occur in a trial context 
(Bornstein, 1999; Sommer, Horowitz, & Bourgeois, 2001). In reference to the 
current research, it would be beneficial to test the effectiveness of a hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention in combination with group deliberation, and the 
requirement of a majority verdict. It is possible that the influence of group processes 
such as conformity, may override the effect of the intervention at the individual level 
(Ruva & Guenther, 2017). Further, it would be useful to test a group hypothesis 
disconfirmation intervention, offering jurors the opportunity to generate alternative 
explanations as a cohort.  
Another limitation of the present study relates to the inclusion of information 
outlining prior offences on behalf of the suspect. There is evidence that knowledge of 
a prior record can sway jurors towards a guilty verdict, even when the court advises 
that this information may not be used to infer guilt for the current charge (Blume, 
2008; Greene & Dodge, 1995). In our study, multiple participants explicitly 
mentioned Mr. Wood’s previous offence as alternative explanations for confessing. 
In this sense, knowledge of a prior record may have underestimated both the extent 
to which jurors are sensitive to inconsistencies, and the effect of the intervention on 
reducing guilt ratings. If jurors were aware of inconsistencies, or generated plausible 
alternative explanations, knowledge of Mr. Wood’s previous offences may have 
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overridden these former considerations, resulting in higher guilt ratings and dulling 
the true effect of the intervention.  
Implications 
There are two key implications of the present study: First, from a theoretical 
standpoint, the results align with an error sensitivity perspective of juror processing 
of confession evidence (Palmer et al., 2016: Woestehoff & Meissner, 2016). That is, 
rather than ignoring or discounting errors in confession evidence, jurors are able to 
identify inconsistencies and take them into account. This challenges the error 
insensitivity perspective and demonstrates that jurors deserve more credit for limiting 
the impact of confirmation bias, and using recognition of inconsistencies to adjust 
their guilt ratings. It also indicates that jurors are better at processing confession 
evidence than anecdotal evidence would have us believe (Kassin, 2012). This 
however, needs to be considered cautiously, as the ecological validity of these 
findings are somewhat limited, and may not accurately represent the experience of 
jurors at trial (Diamond, 1997; Ruva & Guenther, 2017). Although in this instance, 
jurors were adept at responding appropriately to the presence of inconsistencies, it is 
possible, as mentioned above that other factors, such as group dynamics may 
influence the extent of this. It is likely that instances of error sensitivity occur in 
addition to instances of insensitivity.   
Consideration of when error insensitivity is more prevalent, is relevant to the 
second implication of our study. Our results indicate a promising, but not 
convincing, suggestion that the hypothesis disconfirmation intervention may be an 
effective method of increasing juror sensitivity to inconsistencies. Although jurors 
seem to detect and take into account inconsistencies, they do not necessarily do this 
to the best of their ability – this finding provides some evidence for the use of 
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hypothesis disconfirmation in promoting critical appraisal of confessions. To assess 
this further, it would be useful to trial the intervention in situations where 
insensitivity to inconsistencies might be more pronounced. Due to ethical 
requirements, the scenario used in our research outlined a non-violent crime, with no 
specific victim. In contrast to this, in most real-world false confession cases, the 
crime type is typically violent (81% of false confession cases involve homicide; 
Drizin & Leo, 2004), the suspects are overwhelmingly male (93% of false confessors 
are male), with majority female victims (Drizin & Leo, 2004), and there is often a 
racial element to the case (Innocence Project, 2017c). It is possible in these instances, 
where the nature of the crime, and the experience of the victim elicit a strong 
emotional response, that a presumption of guilt is stronger (Kassin, 2012). In such 
cases, a hypothesis disconfirmation may be more effective in preventing people from 
falling prey to cognitive biases associated with automatic heuristic processing. It 
would be valuable to test the intervention further.  
This research project has been valuable in illuminating how inconsistency 
and disconfirmation may interact. Many varied factors operate in a complex way, in 
the context of juries, and research that contributes to the breadth of depth of 
understanding is therefore valuable. It is promising to find that jurors may be more 
proficient than previously anticipated, and that there are interventions that may 
increase juror capabilities further, with both areas benefitting from further research 
and replication.  
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Appendix B  
Participant Information Sheet 
 
Thank you for volunteering to participate in this study - data collection has now 
ended, and this study is no longer available. If you have any questions please 
contact Molly (molly.port@utas.edu.au) 
 
 
Juror Perceptions of Case Evidence - Participant Information Sheet  
Invitation 
We would like to invite you to participate in the study named above. 
This study is being conducted in partial fulfillment of an Honours degree for 
Molly Port under the supervision of Dr Matthew Palmer. 
It is best if this study is completed on a laptop. If you are completing it on a 
phone or tablet, please ensure 'portrait lock' is switched off, and your device 
is landscape oriented.  
What is the purpose of this study? 
This study examines how jurors evaluate evidence and factors that influence 
perceptions of evidence reliability. 
Why have I been invited to participate? 
You have been invited to participate in this study due to your enrolment in 
undergraduate Psychology units at the University of Tasmania, or because 
you are an eligible member of the wider community. 
To participate in this study you must be over the age of 18. 
While we would greatly appreciate your participation in this study we 
recognise and respect your right not to take part. Please note that you will 
not be penalised in any way if you choose not to participate in this study, 
and any relationship you may have with the University of Tasmania will not 
be affected. 
This Participation Information Sheet will explain what is involved with 
participating in this research task. Knowing what is involved will help you 
to decide whether or not you would like to participate in this study, so 
please read this information carefully. 
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What will I be asked to do? 
If you consent to participating in this research study you will be asked to 
imagine you are a jury member, and to read a page of case facts related to a 
non-violent crime. Then, you will be asked to read some evidence regarding 
the suspect related to this crime. You will then be asked to provide 
responses to a series of questions about the materials you have read, 
including providing a verdict response. 
This task is expected to take approximately 30 minutes in total to complete. 
Are there any possible benefits from participation in this study? 
While there may be no direct benefits of this research study to you as a 
participant, this study does have potential benefits for the wider community. 
Understanding how potential jurors evaluate evidence can help to develop 
methods for presenting evidence within a trial that maximise the quality of 
juror decision making. 
Participants who are enrolled in first year psychology units will have the 
option to redeem 0.5 research participation credits from this study. 
If you are not a first year psychology student, or do not wish to redeem 
research participation credit, you will be eligible to go in the draw to win 
one of six $50 gift vouchers. 
To gain research credit, or to enter the draw to win this gift voucher you will 
need to provide us with your email address at the completion of the survey. 
Please note that your email address will be stored in a separate data base to 
your survey questions, and provision of this information will not make your 
answers in anyway identifiable. 
Are there any possible risks from participation in this study? 
We do not believe that there are any foreseeable risks associated with 
participating in this study. 
What if I change my mind during or after the study? 
Please be aware that if you choose to participate in this study, you are free 
to withdraw at any time before submitting the survey. There will be no 
penalties, and you can withdraw without providing us with an explanation. 
If you choose to withdraw prior to submitting your survey all information 
you have provided up until that will be destroyed. Please note that once you 
have submitted your survey it may not be possible to remove your data due 
to the anonymous nature of responses. 
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What will happen to the information when this study is over? 
All data related to participation in this study will be stored securely in the 
Psychology department on the Sandy Bay campus of the University of 
Tasmania. All files will be stored securely on a password-protected hard 
drive. 
It is recommended that all research data is kept for a minimum of 5 years 
from the date of first publication. After this time, online surveys will be 
erased from the hard drive. 
With your permission, we will be archiving the data from this study for use 
in future research studies. By consenting to participate in this study, you are 
also consenting to your data being archived. 
Please note that all data will be de-identified, and all data retained will 
remain confidential and completely anonymous. 
How will the results of the study be published? 
The results of this study will be disseminated in Molly's Honours thesis. 
These results will be finalised by the end of October 2018. If you would like 
access to a summary of results please contact either myself (Molly) 
at Molly.Port@utas.edu.au or Dr Matthew Palmer 
at Matthew.Palmer@utas.edu.au and we will make this available to you as 
soon as possible. 
Please note that all participants will be unidentifiable in the publication of 
results. 
What if I have questions about this study? 
If you have any questions about this study, or would like to report any 
potential risks that may have been overseen during the design phase, please 
do not hesitate to contact us. 
Dr Matthew Palmer 
Email: Matthew.Palmer@utas.edu.au 
Phone: 6324 3004 
Molly Port 
Email: Molly.Port@utas.edu.au 
This study has been approved by the Tasmanian Social Sciences Human 
Research Ethics Committee. If you have concerns or complaints about the 
conduct of this study, please contact the Executive Officer of the HREC 
(Tasmania) Network on 03 6226 6254 or email human.ethics@utas.edu.au. 
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The Executive Officer is the person nominated to receive complaints from 
research participants. Please quote ethics reference number H12662. 
 
Thank you for taking the time to consider participating in this study. 
 
REMINDER: Please note that by consenting to participate in this study, you 
are also providing consent for your data to be anonymously archived for 
use in future studies.  
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Appendix C  
Police Report (conditions 1-6) 
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Appendix D  
Police Report (no-confession control) 
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Appendix E 
Confession Statements 
 
Consistent Confession 
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Small Inconsistencies Confession 
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Large Inconsistencies Confession 
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Appendix F 
Hypothesis Disconfirmation Intervention  
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Appendix G 
Attitudes Towards Coerced Confessions Scale 
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Appendix H 
Cognitive Flexibility Inventory – Alternatives Subscale 
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Appendix I 
Instructional Manipulation Check 
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Appendix J 
Mediation and Moderation Analysis Output 
 
CFI as Moderator 
 
dNotes: These analyses include only Ps in the disconfirmation conditions 
 
CONSISTENT VS LARGE INCONSISTENCIES 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Release 2.041 
**************** 
 
        Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.   http://www.afhayes.com 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Model = 7 
    Y = Guiltrat 
    X = Consiste 
    M = plausibi 
    W = CFITotal 
 
Sample size 
         92 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: plausibi 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3328      .1107     3.6531     3.0000    88.0000      .0156 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    52.4016     2.4365    21.5068      .0000    47.5595    57.2436 
Consiste     5.3282     2.4514     2.1735      .0324      .4564    10.1999 
CFITotal      .0529      .2770      .1912      .8488     -.4975      .6033 
int_1         .6820      .2775     2.4580      .0159      .1306     1.2335 
 
Interactions: 
 
 int_1    Consiste    X     CFITotal 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: Guiltrat 
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Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5466      .2988    18.9644     2.0000    89.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    13.2796     1.3526     9.8179      .0000    10.5920    15.9672 
plausibi     -.0324      .0238    -1.3654      .1756     -.0796      .0148 
Consiste    -3.2012      .5767    -5.5505      .0000    -4.3472    -2.0553 
 
******************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
************************* 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -3.2012      .5767    -5.5505      .0000    -4.3472    -2.0553 
 
 
 
 
 
Conditional indirect effect(s) of X on Y at values of the moderator(s) 
 
Mediator 
           CFITotal     Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
plausibi    -8.8519      .0230      .1887     -.2629      .5844 
plausibi      .0000     -.1728      .1890     -.7095      .0749 
plausibi     8.8519     -.3687      .3417    -1.2618      .1468 
 
Values for quantitative moderators are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. 
Values for dichotomous moderators are the two values of the moderator. 
 
******************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND WARNINGS 
************************* 
 
Number of bootstrap samples for bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals: 
     1000 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
    95.00 
 
NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis: 
 Consiste CFITotal 
 
NOTE: Some cases were deleted due to missing data.  The number of such cases 
was: 
  79 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
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CONSISTENT VS SMALL INCONSISTENCIES 
 
 
Run MATRIX procedure: 
 
**************** PROCESS Procedure for SPSS Release 2.041 
**************** 
 
        Written by Andrew F. Hayes, Ph.D.   http://www.afhayes.com 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Model = 7 
    Y = Guiltrat 
    X = Consiste 
    M = plausibi 
    W = CFITotal 
 
Sample size 
         78 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: plausibi 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .1985      .0394     1.0113     3.0000    74.0000      .3927 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    45.3398     2.6358    17.2012      .0000    40.0877    50.5918 
Consiste     -.9100     5.2786     -.1724      .8636   -11.4279     9.6079 
CFITotal     -.3570      .2893    -1.2344      .2210     -.9334      .2193 
int_1         .7298      .5781     1.2624      .2108     -.4221     1.8817 
 
Interactions: 
 
 int_1    Consiste    X     CFITotal 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: Guiltrat 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3004      .0902     3.7189     2.0000    75.0000      .0288 
 
Model 
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              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    13.1748     1.4081     9.3564      .0000    10.3697    15.9799 
plausibi      .0117      .0276      .4227      .6737     -.0434      .0668 
Consiste    -3.4380     1.2806    -2.6846      .0089    -5.9892     -.8869 
 
******************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
************************* 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -3.4380     1.2806    -2.6846      .0089    -5.9892     -.8869 
 
Conditional indirect effect(s) of X on Y at values of the moderator(s) 
 
Mediator 
           CFITotal     Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
plausibi    -9.1787     -.0889      .3372    -1.3006      .2994 
plausibi      .0000     -.0106      .1773     -.4490      .3122 
plausibi     9.1787      .0676      .3124     -.2603     1.2470 
 
Values for quantitative moderators are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. 
Values for dichotomous moderators are the two values of the moderator. 
 
******************** ANALYSIS NOTES AND WARNINGS 
************************* 
 
Number of bootstrap samples for bias corrected bootstrap confidence intervals: 
     1000 
 
Level of confidence for all confidence intervals in output: 
    95.00 
 
NOTE: The following variables were mean centered prior to analysis: 
 Consiste CFITotal 
 
NOTE: Some cases were deleted due to missing data.  The number of such cases 
was: 
  77 
 
------ END MATRIX ----- 
 
 
Coerced Confessions Subscale as Moderator 
 
Control vs small inconsistencies 
Model = 7 
    Y = Guiltrat 
    X = Consiste 
    M = plausibi 
    W = ATCC_Coe 
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Sample size 
         78 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: plausibi 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .1523      .0232      .5858     3.0000    74.0000      .6262 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    45.2390     2.6652    16.9741      .0000    39.9285    50.5495 
Consiste     -.6013     5.3376     -.1127      .9106   -11.2369    10.0342 
ATCC_Coe    -1.0501     1.0016    -1.0484      .2979    -3.0458      .9457 
int_1        1.4691     2.0116      .7303      .4675    -2.5390     5.4772 
 
Interactions: 
 
 int_1    Consiste    X     ATCC_Coe 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: Guiltrat 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3004      .0902     3.7189     2.0000    75.0000      .0288 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    13.1748     1.4081     9.3564      .0000    10.3697    15.9799 
plausibi      .0117      .0276      .4227      .6737     -.0434      .0668 
Consiste    -3.4380     1.2806    -2.6846      .0089    -5.9892     -.8869 
 
******************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
************************* 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -3.4380     1.2806    -2.6846      .0089    -5.9892     -.8869 
 
Conditional indirect effect(s) of X on Y at values of the moderator(s) 
 
Mediator 
           ATCC_Coe     Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
plausibi    -2.6822     -.0531      .2541     -.8905      .2515 
plausibi      .0000     -.0070      .1617     -.4041      .3175 
  
71 
plausibi     2.6822      .0390      .2330     -.2667      .8589 
 
Values for quantitative moderators are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. 
Values for dichotomous moderators are the two values of the moderator. 
 
Control vs large inconsistencies 
Model = 7 
    Y = Guiltrat 
    X = Consiste 
    M = plausibi 
    W = ATCC_Coe 
 
Sample size 
         92 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: plausibi 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .3111      .0968     3.1443     3.0000    88.0000      .0291 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    51.8257     2.4506    21.1480      .0000    46.9556    56.6958 
Consiste     5.0566     2.4655     2.0509      .0433      .1568     9.9563 
ATCC_Coe    -1.8783      .8798    -2.1349      .0355    -3.6266     -.1299 
int_1        -.1184      .8884     -.1333      .8943    -1.8839     1.6471 
 
Interactions: 
 
 int_1    Consiste    X     ATCC_Coe 
 
********************************************************************
****** 
Outcome: Guiltrat 
 
Model Summary 
          R       R-sq          F        df1        df2          p 
      .5466      .2988    18.9644     2.0000    89.0000      .0000 
 
Model 
              coeff         se          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
constant    13.2796     1.3526     9.8179      .0000    10.5920    15.9672 
plausibi     -.0324      .0238    -1.3654      .1756     -.0796      .0148 
Consiste    -3.2012      .5767    -5.5505      .0000    -4.3472    -2.0553 
 
******************** DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS 
************************* 
  
72 
 
Direct effect of X on Y 
     Effect         SE          t          p       LLCI       ULCI 
    -3.2012      .5767    -5.5505      .0000    -4.3472    -2.0553 
 
Conditional indirect effect(s) of X on Y at values of the moderator(s) 
 
Mediator 
           ATCC_Coe     Effect    Boot SE   BootLLCI   BootULCI 
plausibi    -2.8024     -.1748      .2425     -.9601      .0963 
plausibi      .0000     -.1640      .1857     -.7010      .0767 
plausibi     2.8024     -.1533      .1961     -.8284      .0935 
 
Values for quantitative moderators are the mean and plus/minus one SD from mean. 
Values for dichotomous moderators are the two values of the moderator. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
